Discussion about this post

User's avatar
John Vervaeke's avatar

Excellent! In my series with Gregg Henriques entitled Untangling the WorldKnot of Consciousness. I developed with Gregg an extended argument for how relevance realization theory could be used to explain both the nature and function of consciousness in a way that subsumes both IIT and GWT. The fact that Brett has converged on this so brilliantly is wonderful!! John Vervaeke

Expand full comment
Omri Cohen's avatar

I find the theory above very compelling, but it is actually meta-consciousness that you are accounting for and not phenomenal consciousness.

1) Jung and Neumann are using different definitions than we seem to be using these days. Jung’s notion of consciousness is what we call today meta-consciousness, the ability to know that we are experiencing and therefore be able to report about it. (This can be seen very obviously in Jung's theory of the complexes and in many other different places).

2) Integrated Information Theory (IIT) - The phi threshold is denoted by the reportability of the participants, thus passing the threshold provides excellent empirical evidence for meta-consciousness or access consciousness and not for phenomenal consciousness.

3) Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and the ignition event - The same argument goes for the GWT. After the ignition event, the experience hinted by the visual cortex simply becomes associated with the metacognitive loop.

4) Psychedelic research and specific claims made by Carhart-Harris - The most reliable and replicable finding in psychedelic research is the decrease in brain activity. The Rebus model and subsequent claims made by Cahart-Harris have been properly criticized for attempting to account for the phenomenology of psychedelics with minuscule changes in signal diversity, yet ignoring their own previous publications showing a clear reduction in all brain activity. There are many more instances where much greater signal diversity changes occur where there is no equivalent increase in inner conscious experience.

I would propose that a view of the brain as more of a reduction valve for consciousness would fit the data more and that the self-organizing criticality is indicative not of phenomenal consciousness but of access consciousness/metacognition.

To be honest I’m not at all sure of my position here. I have been really influenced by Vervaeke’s work and you would relieve me of much cognitive dissonance if you could prove me wrong.

Here’s a link to the article criticizing Carhart-Harris: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/misreporting-and-confirmation-bias-in-psychedelic-research/

Expand full comment
13 more comments...

No posts